INTRODUCTION

One of the guiding forces of modern democratic societies is to ensure that those who govern do so in the best interests of the people whom they govern.  As such they should ideally be representative of those people, and this representation should be current. Regular elections by enfranchised voters are the most commonly accepted means of ensuring such representative government.

However, often the percentage of the eligible population that votes is disappointingly low, and the result is that the mandate of the elected government becomes questionable resulting in a lack of trust in their decisions. Gaining voter participation is thus a primary objective of the organizers of such elections.

There are many factors that can facilitate or impede voter participation and one of those is the means by which voters can vote. Over the decades, in-person voting has been commonly augmented by postal voting, and more recently by Internet voting (I-voting) in some places.

The merit of I-voting for public governance has yet to be demonstrated conclusively. While there are many aspects of I-voting that need to be considered, one of the most important groups is the sociological aspects. It is believed that with a good understanding of these factors, greater participation can be facilitated and obstacles overcome. Although this applies to both national and local government elections, most of the initial work with regard to the introduction of I-voting has been in the local government context. Local government elections are easier to control and monitor and they provide an ideal opportunity to explore certain practices and mechanisms without the large risk associated with national elections.

While various researchers have explored different aspects of I-voting, no comprehensive study appears to have focused on the sociological aspects specifically. Prompted by a commission from the Society of Local Government Managers (SOLGM) of New Zealand, a study was undertaken to identify the relevant sociological factors and to develop a model which could later be used to determine the relative effects of these factors on I-voting. In this way, greater insights would be gained and avenues would be identified as to how best to ensure and maintain significant voter participation.

Local Government elections were chosen over national elections due to the significant complexity it brings, such as (1) there are multiple contests (Mayor, Local/Territorial Authority Councillors, Regional Councillors, Community Boards, Licensing Trusts (LEA 2001 s 7), District Health Boards, Electricity Boards (LEA 2001 s 8) and more), (2) there are possibly multiple election systems (FPP and STV) with each event, and (3) placing Internet connections in polling booths is not an option because it is less convenient than the current postal voting system even though the controlled environment would increase the security levels against hackers.

 

 This paper reports on that study. First the background to I-voting is presented. Next the sociological factors influencing the uptake of I-voting for local government elections are explored.

BACKGROUND

To vote has been succinctly defined as “to express one’s preference” (Morris, 1970, p. 1437). Voting has become an essential way for democratic societies to elect their governments. However, throughout the democratic world, there has been a particularly low voter turnout. While turnout rose globally between 1945 and 1990, since the 68% average high in the 1980s, the percentage has dropped to 64%. Local government election turnout has been even lower.  In some areas a 20 to 50% participation rate has become the norm (Internet Policy Institute (IPI), 2001, p. 25).  This lowers democracy, diminishes trust and public confidence in government (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 14), and calls into question the legitimacy of and the mandate given to the representatives (Clarke, 2002, p. 13).

In order to increase voter participation, and to meet the needs of different groups of voters, the method of voting has expanded from only polling booth voting to include postal voting, and more recently, I-voting.

I-voting can be regarded as a subset of e-voting as it is limited to casting electronic votes via the Internet only (Smith & Clark, 2005).  While e-voting deals with the technologies that minimize the human aspect of vote collection and recording, I-voting is “the use of online information gathering and retrieval technologies to expand the reach and range of the potential voting population” (Smith & Clark, 2005). I-voting is thus dependent on the technological elements of e-voting. However, this papter excludes the concept of e-voting in polling booths because while it may technically occur over the Internet, the social aspects of such voting are different to those encountered when voting from other places.

Internet-based voting systems hold much promise. The Internet is a popular means of communication in many different segments of society, and by introducing this concept of “e-democracy” it is envisaged that such an interactive medium will enhance citizen participation (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 562-4).  In addition, if sizeable and well promoted, an Internet election might prompt the herding instinct and create a desire to participate in such a major Internet event (California Internet Voting Taskforce (CIVT), 2000A, p. 23).

While the ability of the Internet, per se, and its availability to increase voter participation is significant, it is important to gain public acceptance for an I-voting system (Morse, 2002). If I-voting is viewed skeptically by a large number of voters, then the fundamental trust in the democratic process may be compromised (CIVT, 2000A, p. 4-5).

To some degree the pressure voters have placed on authorities to implement I-voting grew out of the very public failure of the old systems as dramatized in Florida in the 2000 presidential election (Francisco, 2000).  The exacting systems of computer technology are seen as being able to provide a solution (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). 

Although acceptance of the concept of I-voting for local government elections has been very high, for example, 82% in Ottawa, Canada, (Geist, 2005), select councils in the UK (UK Department of Constitutional Affairs, 2007), and even 75-90% in the US (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 3), the actual percentages of those who choose to vote over the Internet is still relatively small. For example, 1.85% of the 72% who accepted the concept in Estonia (Breuer & Trechsel, 2005) actually voted over the Internet. Also, the local government Internet elections in England observed by Robertson & Ofsoske (2002) did not experience a substantial increase in turnout. There is thus still much scope for the promotion of I-voting.

It should be noted that though I-voting for private elections is fairly common (Carey, 2000) there are decided dissimilarities. I-voting for public elections takes place against a backdrop of the elections industry. In most democracies, elections are guided by principles that voters would consider to be fair and equitable. In addition, the vulnerability of the Internet and typical Internet activity contribute to this backdrop.

Principles of free and fair elections

Elections can be regarded as a process – as a means to an end, the end being democracy. They ensure the orderly transfer of power, and if there is any suspicion of untoward behavior, the legitimacy of the government may suffer and civil disorder result (Green, 2000, p. 2).  By being conducted in a free and fair fashion, elections can ensure the voters’ trust and confidence in the outcome.

There are many comprehensive overviews of what are regarded as the guiding principles of free and fair elections. The following list is indicative of those principles that would be particularly relevant to the sociological aspects of I-voting:

• The election should enable “fair and effective representation for individuals and communities” (Electoral Task Team, 2003, p. 16-17).
• Every eligible voter should be enabled to participate - voting facilities should be fully accessible and available (KPMG and Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 14). 
• Every eligible voter should have a reasonable and equal opportunity to cast an informed vote.
• The voter should be assured of the secrecy of his/her vote. Other synonyms for this principle are privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity.
• There should be security measures which protect the integrity of the process (KPMG and Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 5).
• The voting processes should be:

o       simple – the voting should not be unduly complicated (Electoral Task Team, 2003, p. 9),

o       publicly acceptable (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 5).

The Internet industry

With regard to the Internet, there are many concerns, especially its vulnerability to hackers. It is thus important to examine what motivation there may be for hackers to be interested in local authority elections. 

• Elections get high profile media coverage and more so if things go wrong. With the high level of visibility, the hacker gets a sense of power (Weinstein, 2000B).
• Hacking is usually done for the thrill rather than for monetary gain (Experts: Halt Internet voting programs, 2004).
• A hacker, knowing that little/no expense has been spared to make the system hacker-resistant, would be more motivated to meet the challenge - just to prove s/he can.
• In some close campaigns, a hacker need only influence a few votes to make a difference.
• Elected officials have control over a lot of very valuable assets (Ananthaswamy, 2004, p. 8) so the hacker could influence the use of those assets to his/her personal benefit.
• A candidate might pay a hacker to make sure s/he wins the seat (CIVT, 2000B, p. 22). 
• A foreign government might pay a hacker to make sure a candidate who would promote policies that benefit that government was elected (Rubin, 2002, p. 44).

On the other hand, with his/her considerable expertise, it is questionable whether a hacker would bother using their skills to change an election result that provides them with no monetary benefit, rather than focusing on a more lucrative target such as banking, credit cards, and trade. A local authority election would probably not be considered worth the risk of jail (CIVT, 2000B, p. 19).

Thus, while many authorities assume that if a malicious code attack is possible, it will happen sooner or later (Francisco, 2000), local contests are believed to be less likely to be subjected to sophisticated attacks, and the consequence of election failures would be smaller (IPI, 2001, p. 24).

With regard to typical Internet activity, as increasing numbers of people are using the Internet for their banking, purchases, private elections, education and personal communication (IPI, 2001, p. ii), it could be assumed that I-voting for public elections would be adopted with relative ease. However, there are distinct differences between public and private elections, and between public elections run on the Internet and everyday e-commerce transactions.

In comparison with private elections, firstly, public elections are held under the jurisdiction of election officials and are subject to local and central government election laws. They are thus generally more rigidly and rigorously executed than private elections (IPI, 2001, p. 8). Secondly, in the private sector, and unlike the public sector, proxy voting is permitted. Finally, because public elections receive much greater attention than private elections, they face a higher possibility of fraud and malicious attack (IPI, 2001, p. 8).

 With regard to the difference with e-commerce transactions, the laws governing commercial transactions are fundamentally different from the laws governing public elections (Gerck, 2000).

• If a product or service is unsatisfactory, it can be returned and/or a refund received. Election ‘transactions’ cannot be reversed or changed   (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 22).
• In a commercial transaction, a great deal of personal, private information is sacrificed for the sake of ensuring that the transaction is secure (Perera et al., 2000).  However, with voting, only the identity of the voter is known. Disclosure of any other information about the ‘transaction’ would constitute a breach of privacy (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 570).
• If the database of e-commerce transactions is lost or compromised, the individual data can be retrieved from a back-up. The individual ‘transactions’ in a public election cannot be retrieved (Green, 2000, p. 3).
• The time delay in such a situation would not be critical in an e-commerce situation, but it would in an election.
• Online financial transactions are usually followed by confirmatory account statements, thereby providing opportunity to correct errors. With public elections that would not be possible (CIVT, 2000B, p. 25).
• Online financial fraud and the theft of credit card databases are not uncommon; and some even go undetected and are then written off as a cost of doing business. With public elections, this would be unacceptable.

 COUNTRY PROFILES

 

So what’s been happening regarding Internet elections?  Although some i-voting has occurred in the Scandinavian countries, I will focus on Australia, Canada, England, South Africa, and the United States of America due to their similarity to New Zealand in aspects such as democracy, English speaking and “westernised" cultures.  In general, interest in I-voting is high in “westernised” countries, regardless of the nature of the individual electoral system.  However, no country has yet to fully adopted remote I-voting technology on a large scale.

Australia

Private elections using the Internet have occurred in Australia.  For example the NRMA Board of Directors were elected by its two million members using Internet technology (Barry et al., 2001, p. 10).

Because voting is compulsory, elector participation is no motive for providing I-voting.  However the motive for change came as a result of an incident in 1998 wherein

“a close result in the Molonglo electorate (when 2 candidates were 3 votes apart at the point where one of them had to be excluded) and the resultant recount (which saw the relative order of these candidates change due to mistakes made in the original manual count) led to calls for computerised voting and counting processes to increase the speed and accuracy of counting system.  After further investigation the Commission concluded that electronic voting should be provided in a controlled environment at pre-poll voting centres and polling places” (Australian Capital Territory.  Electoral Commission, 2003).

In summary, Australia has used the Internet for private elections, trailed it for public elections in a controlled environment, and is considering introducing remote I-voting under specific circumstances.

Canada

Canada is highly motivated to provide greater access to elections for its voters that does not require them to leave home because treacherous weather conditions can hinder their mobility.  There is a strong public acceptance for introducing new voting technologies.

A number of jurisdictions have changed their legislation to make it legally possible to begin experimenting with new voting technologies and some have launched pilot projects (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 5).

After studying the options, Canada has opted to use the telephone as its remote voting technology.  They chose not to adopt I-voting in a legally binding manner (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 582). 

England

 

In 2002, two of the SOLGM members traveled to England to observe their local government elections.  As their observations did not include Scotland or Wales, the United Kingdom is not represented (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 2). 

The mischief to spark the change to seek new voting initiatives was a concern for low voter turnout (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 3).

Some districts ran their elections using postal voting.  The districts observed in 2002 trialled electronic voting in the polling booth, over the Internet, text messaging and by telephone which were running in parallel with the postal voting system.  There were exceptions, of course, but in general, “postal voting proved to be the only really effective means of improving voter turnout” (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 5).  Second in line after the postal method was Internet and telephone voting.  The least popular was electronic voting in a controlled environment such as a polling booth or kiosk (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 6).

Regardless of the provision of multiple means of voting, it remains true that the higher the socio economic status of the voter, the greater the voter turnout (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 7).  Voter turnout in pilot areas with all-electronic voting (including I-voting) was just half the turnout in areas with all postal votes (One step beyond, 2004).

Although concerns were expressed regarding the security, risks of fraud, and malpractice with all the methods apart from the polling booth, no increase in fraud or malpractice was detected (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 8). 

South Africa

During South Africa’s first election that applied universal adult suffrage in 1994, riots occurred as people in long queues were turned away as there were inadequate polling places to cater for the large number of electors.  These problems were corrected for the election in June 1999 in part by putting in place “a network of computers linking polling stations in remote villages and townships to a central headquarters in Pretoria” (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 565).  Although this was electronic voting and not I-voting as is the focus of this study, it was hailed as a great success.

United States of America

In the U.S., using the Internet for private elections is increasingly common (IPI, 2001, p. 8). 

Regarding public elections, during the 1998 midterm elections, voter turnout fell to the lowest level in 58 years (Francisco, 2000).  With this concern, President Clinton made funds available for a year-long study to look at the option of I-voting in the hopes that increased convenience would increase voter turnout (IPI, 2001, p. 6).  Although the original scope was to research I-voting for participation purposes, the problems experienced subsequently in 2000 with the Florida recount caused a demand from technophiles and beleaguered election officials for using computers to be generated (Rubin, 2002, p. 39; Manjoo, 2000B, p. 2; Salkever, 2000) to increase accuracy and reliability of election systems.  The original concern of increasing convenience became a secondary concern (IPI, 2001, p. 6). 

At the end of the day, the US would only accept remote I-voting for the military and government employees and their dependents based overseas (IPI, 2001, p. 2).

The Defense department decided to abandon the plan for providing I-voting for the 2004 election because it was too easy for hackers to interfere with voting, there were no guarantees that each person voted only once, and there were no guarantees of the vote remaining secret (One step beyond, 2004).

Arizona

The Arizona Democratic primary of 11 March 2000 was notable for being the first state-wide, legally binding remote Internet election for political office in the world (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 3, 5; Barry et al., 2001, p. 6; Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 562; Rubin, 2002, p. 39; Solop, 2001, p. 293; Weinstein, 2000A, p. 1).  It was technically a private election, contracted by the state’s Democratic party; thus it did not have to meet stringent state election certification and legislative requirements.  Accordingly, no law change was necessary before it occurred (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 565).

One of the most dramatic features of the election was the jump in turnout which shattered the previous record (White, 2000, p. 1).  Of a total 85,970 registered voters, 39,943 people cast ballots remotely, 20,000 more used mail-in ballots, and another 20,000 actually came to the polling booths (Anthony, 2000, p. 2; Kantor, 2000, p. 1; Lee, 2000, p. 1-2).  This represented 10 percent of registered Democrats in Arizona, a healthy percentage for any primary election (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 575).  A significant publicity campaign was run both by the Party and by the software developers regarding the historical significance of the “first legally binding” Internet election which was thought to have been a factor for the increased turnout.  More than half the I-votes were cast after Bradley dropped out of the race making all votes pointless (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 575).  Interestingly, turnout would have been greater had I-voting not been affected by technological problems.  Four percent of registered Democrats tried to vote over the Internet but were unsuccessful and never cast a ballot (Solop, 2001, p. 290-1).

New Zealand

Private Internet elections have occurred at many places such as the Meat and Wool Board, Fonterra and the Automobile Association.  A semi-public election with the Hutt-Mana Energy Trust Board (2001) was conducted.  I analysed the Trust Board election in detail and those details are covered elsewhere.

As a background, the New Zealand government is committed to using networks and Internet technologies to deliver government information, services and processes.  To that end it established the E-government Unit within the State Services Commission who in turn developed standards and web sites to facilitate that goal.   It is hoped that this initiative will improve the opportunities for people and business to effectively participate in government (Sommer, 2003).

In line with the government’s e-goals and providing the service of voting using the Internet, an on-line voting strategy was developed by the CEO (NZ.  Ministry of Justice, 2003) for the election of Parliamentarians. 

Voter turnout declined until the introduction of postal voting at which time there was a sharp increase in voter participation (New Zealand.  House of Representatives, 1999, p. 5).  However, over time participation figures slipped back to disappointing levels. 

SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS

As has already been alluded to, trust is a pre-eminent aspect of a governmental election.

TRUST

Trust in the election process is at the very heart of the world's democracies.  One way to build trust is by demonstrating credibility over time. 

Initial credibility is established with openness, honesty, access and convenience, and as the perceptions of safety increase (Rubin, 2002, p. 44) so voter confidence is built over time (Rubin, 2002, p. 39).

Information should be easy to find and accurate (Rubin, 2002, p. 44), and should be displayed in a clean, straightforward fashion (Huma, 1999). Familiarity should be nurtured by designing the I-voting system to mirror current paper-based voting systems as closely as possible (CIVT, 2000B, p. 11-12).

The system should also be tested thoroughly – and voters need to be assured of this. This can be done by logic and accuracy tests and by making these test results public. Post-event audits should also be conducted. This ability is critical to building public trust (CIVT, 2000A, p. 27).

Once trust is built, people tend to adopt an umbrella perspective and trust all aspects of a system, such as electoral rolls, the scrutineers, and the ballot-counting. Similarly, over time attitudes to new technologies change as those technologies become ever more present in their lives.  People see that these technologies work and develop a degree of trust in them that is not shaken by the fact that many of these systems have flaws and can be compromised (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 59).

However, trust can easily be broken.  This can be caused by bad publicity, or the fact that if something goes wrong in the public sector, there is no redress as there is in commercial transactions (Perera et al., 2000), or if a new process (e.g. I-voting) is perceived to undermine the legitimacy of an old process (e.g. booth or postal voting) (IPI, 2001, p. 25).

Hacker attacks are another threat. Electoral Officers will have to overcome public perceptions that hackers can get in and tinker with votes (Bowman, 2000). Furthermore, even before it happens, security experts will surely publicly criticize any election system having an inadequate security system and that publicity could cause a loss of the public confidence in such a system (CIVT, 2000B, p. 22) and in the certainty of election outcome (Weinstein, 2000A, p. 2).

A number of polls have been run which ascertained the confidence that voters had in the security of I-voting systems. In New Zealand, it appeared that the youth, Wellingtonians, and people with high income and education levels were more likely to view Internet transactions as secure (Sommer, 2003). Other surveys conducted mainly in the US (Solop 2001, p. 289; Watson, 2000) have all had favorable outcomes with regard to perceptions of security.

There are a number of factors which can impact on trust in I-voting and these are discussed below.

Gradual Implementation of New Systems

One method of gaining public acceptance is to gradually phase in the implementation of I-voting (CIVT, 2000A, p. 7). This can be done in a couple of ways: by initially implementing it into one or two constituencies, with a roll out to more constituencies in future elections; or by continuing to offer the booth, postal and special voting systems in parallel with I-voting (CIVT, 2000A, p. 17). In addition, Internet connections can be put into polling booths (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 28). I-voting then becomes an extension of choice (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 14; Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 571) and accommodates voters who are technophobic and reject I-voting (IPI, 2001, p. 17). If postal voting should ever cease, then Internet kiosks need to be more readily available than neighborhood post boxes or else the Internet system will be less convenient for some than the traditional postal voting (Huma, 1999).

Scrutineers

Using scrutineers is another way of gaining public acceptance. Scrutineers are individuals from differing and conflicting interests selected by election candidates to observe, behind the scenes, the scrutiny of electoral rolls; the decisions regarding possible informal votes or spoilt voting papers; and the processing and possibly the counting of the votes (IPI, 2001, p. 27).  In some elections they may also, at any time in the voting process, view a list of people who have already voted (CIVT, 2000A, p. 30) so as to encourage those who have not voted to do so.

Scrutineers can and do play a vital role in gaining and maintaining public acceptance of the voting process. They can ensure that the delicate balance between secrecy and the election integrity is maintained (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 23); they can ensure that the requirements of transparency are fulfilled (IPI, 2001, p. 28) – even with I-voting (Alexander & Jefferson, 2000, p. 2); and they can ensure that no one individual or authority can change the outcome of the election (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 23).

Publishing the Source Code

Yet another issue to consider is whether the source code should be published or not.  For the most part, the public are disinterested (Russell & Cunningham, 2000, p. 3). However, should the code be challenged in any way, the public would soon become anxious and very concerned (Green & Kunze-Hamel, 2001A, p. 1).

Although publishing source code for most computerized functions is not routinely done, it can be done for very sensitive issues, such as electronic voting or counting programs (Green & Kunze-Hamel, 2001C, p. 2).  There are advantages and disadvantages to either publishing the source code or not but the advantages of making the source code available for public review significantly outweigh the disadvantages (IPI, 2001, p. 22). The main advantage is that the public perceive the procedure as being as transparent as possible (Lyman, 2005). Although this may stifle the innovativeness of some developers, the public are provided with the opportunity to know, in as much detail as they are capable of understanding, exactly how their elections are conducted (IPI, 2001, p. 21).  In general, “security by obscurity doesn't work” (Russell & Cunningham, 2000, p. 2). One caveat is that the security code should not be published (IPI, 2001, p. 22).

An alternative to publishing the source code would be for independent experts to evaluate and scrutinize the code. They should provide certification that the software system is performing the intended functions, and that the system has no security vulnerabilities (Weinstein, 2000B).

Voter Education

Another method of developing trust is to orchestrate a multi-faceted, comprehensive voter education program. This would entail a large-scale communication campaign to inform voters of the proposed changes (Green & Kunze-Hamel, 2001C, p. 1).

In determining the most appropriate ways of communication, appeals should be made to the various learning styles. 

The general principles in compiling the components of this communication are that it should comprise well written and informative press (Huma, 1999) and media statements (CIVT, 2000B, p. 25) that should be issued frequently. The messages should be kept simple and free of jargon (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 32), and instruction sheets/screen dumps, practice sites (CIVT, 2000B, p. 25) and answers to frequently asked questions (CIVT, 2000A, p. 30) should be provided. Online technical support (CIVT, 2000B, p. 25) and telephone help lines (CIVT, 2000A, p. 30) should also be available. 

APATHY

Yet another sociological aspect that can significantly influence the uptake of I-voting, is apathy.

Greater involvement of the public in decision-making leads to both better government and better citizens.  This is central to the idea of democracy (Clarke, 2002, p. i).   Therefore it is worthwhile to strive to resolve as many of the apathy issues as possible.

 Apathy occurs

• when the voters think that none of the candidates represents them or adequately responds to them, and that candidates are motivated out of personal interest rather than public interest (Seidenfeld, 1992, p. 1);
• when the authority avidly seeks the  views of the people but when decisions are made, only the views of the bureaucrats appear to be considered (DeLeon, 1995, p. 4);
• when the voter does not have enough information on either the candidates or the relevant policies and issues, or else when he/she has a bewildering overabundance of information (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 17); 
• when the voter does not know how to vote and the process seems too complicated to learn (Clarke, 2002, p. 23); 
• when the real issues of interest are not featured in the election, and/or it might seem to revolve more around personalities than issues (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 18);
• when the election system appears unfair; 
• when there is nothing, such as a personal invitation, to mobilize the voter to vote (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 18);
• when it seems that too many decisions are taken behind closed doors and that the public is excluded (Clarke, 2002, p. 23); 
• when demographic minorities feel that their voice is not heard (Clarke, 2002, p. 22); and
• when the voter’s interest is elsewhere, such as on daily survival struggles, or with the sorts of issues young people face (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 10), and they cannot see a connection between voting and the issues going on in their lives (Clarke, 2002, p. 2).

Despite these various reasons for apathy, all indications are that people believe in the democratic principles underpinning the system of representative government and want to be involved - especially on issues such as health, education and crime (Clarke, 2002, p. i-ii, 13, 20). Many feel that their only chance to have an influence on government policies is at election time (Clarke, 2002, p. 22) when the balance of power shifts away from the politician back to the voter (Chidi, 2000).  Rousseau captured this aptly in 1712, stating that people are “free only during the election of Members of Parliament; as soon as the Members are elected, the people are enslaved” (Cole, 1968).

If the Internet is only seen as a novel tool to aid the convenience of voting, it will not provide an answer to apathy (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 17).  However, it can assist in providing more information on the candidates, their policies and the relevant issues. The information can be specifically targeted, with the ability to control the depth to which a topic can be researched. The relative importance of policy issues and the impact they have on people’s daily lives can be highlighted. It can also teach the novice voter how to vote, and can be used to hold many little referenda to determine the people’s needs and interests. A caveat, though, is the perception by some that electronic forms of involvement are too impersonal and ineffective, and that views expressed electronically are too easily ignored by decision makers (Clarke, 2002, p. 28). 

FEATURES OF THE INTERNET

Leading on from the discussion above, it is evident that there are a number of features of the Internet which can impact on voter participation. Some are more obviously positive than others.

Information Resource

Some voters have indicated their lack of voting participation was related to the lack of information regarding the candidates and/or the policies at stake (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). However, the Internet is viewed as a vehicle for improved communication and access to information. It provides the flexibility to keep the information up-to-date (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 573) and present the information in various formats (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p.  28).

 With increased access to the Internet, World Wide Web users who vote in elections report that this access to information has increased their involvement in politics. This bodes well for I-voting (Barber et al., 1997, p. 5), given that in 2006 74% of the New Zealand population used the Internet, while in 2007 70% of the US and 65% of the Canadian populations did (Internet World Stats, 2008), with the concomitant rise in the use of the Web.

Furthermore, the Internet can act as a lively forum for debate and the exchange of information from many different perspectives without the filtering and monitoring that is often practiced by governments. However, such freedom of expression can result in abuse and inflammatory insults which detract from the objective of providing sound, inclusive input on an issue. This and the mere quantity of views and input provided can result in a huge quantity of confusing information. The result might then be an exasperated abandonment of the whole exercise (Bellamy & Taylor, 1998). On the positive side, there are some sites on the Internet that provide facilitated and moderated discussion that maintains freedom of speech and inclusivity and that helps citizens educate themselves for more intelligent decision-making.

Increases Convenience

In terms of increasing convenience, this can be seen from the perspectives of increasing convenience of access – physical and time – and increasing convenience of choice. Often voters, such as those who are self-employed or work for multiple employers, or who are single parents, have very limited time resources. Attending a polling booth is difficult (Griffin, 2007, p. 1). With I-voting, the voter can cast his/her vote at any time of the day or night. Although this increases the convenience over booth voting, it does not do so over postal voting. However, I-voting increases the convenience of choice between the three options. Furthermore, it provides the convenience of being able to access additional information about the candidates and their policies during the actual voting process, if necessary (CIVT, 2000A, p. 19).

Decreases Complexity

With the familiarity that populations are acquiring in the use of computers and the Internet, voting systems can be designed along the lines of systems that most users are acquainted with (IPI, 2001, p. 12), thereby reducing the complexity (CIVT, 2000A, p. 7-8), appealing to more voters, and speeding up the whole voting process (IPI, 2001, p. 12).

Sense of Community

One of the debates regarding I-voting is whether it facilitates social cohesion and community networks, or whether it undermines them by replacing the face-to-face interaction with online interaction (IPI, 2001, p. 30).

The opponents of I-voting fear it will diminish any sense of community, civic involvement, political engagement or civic trust.  They fear it will create a loss of community contact (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 564).  People may become remote  and vote purely from an individual perspective and not from a collective perspective (Galston, 1999, p. 2).  Such an individualistic view is speculated to lead to a decrease in voter turnout and a lack of engagement (IPI, 2001, p. 25). 

On the other hand, it is argued that the Internet’s interactivity and decentralized control structure works to offer the greatest potential to reinvigorate civic life (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 562).  Chat rooms and discussion fora can prove particularly motivational and mobilizing (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 18; Galston, 1999, p. 3) and virtual communities can develop from these interest groups (Galston, 1999, p. 3).

Bearing in mind that modern western society is based on two principal cultural tennets:  the high value attached to individual choice, and the longing for community (Galston, 1999, p. 2), although neither exists without the other, it is unknown whether the effects of I-voting on social cohesion would be significantly different from postal voting in the context of larger social changes.

Trivializing Democracy

Another point worth consideration is whether the use of the Internet for voting might be affected by the typical perception of the Internet as a place for fun and casual activities, and not a place for reasoned, reflective judgment (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 570).  It is feared that even though the Internet may bring more participation, the quality of that participation may be suspect (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 567).  I-voting may be too quick and easy, and people may view it casually, use it impulsively and not give it the rational and reasoned deliberation it deserves (IPI, 2001, p. 26).

However, the process for I-voting with all its authentication requirements will have a degree of complexity and will not be as easy as checking emails or purchasing a book. 

Disintermediation

As stated above, many people feel that their elected representatives often do not represent them adequately. Where I-voting has been implemented, such as with commercial transactions, the spin-off has often been that the Internet works as a disintermediator (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 17).  Some of the opponents of I-voting for public elections fear the possible change from representative democracy to a form of plebiscitory, direct democracy (IPI, 2001, p. 39). 

However, the current forms of representative democracy promote deliberation over efficiency and intentionally limit the excesses of direct democracy. Although it slows down lawmaking, it encourages consensus building.  It proposes to protect minorities with its deliberation (IPI, 2001, p. 13, 29-30), and it frees up the public from having to spend their time voting on every possible issue that could impact on them – even more so, having to spend the time to become sufficiently well-informed so as to cast a meaningful vote.

There does not appear to be any evidence of this disintermediation having become entrenched in local government. Rather, the Internet is used as a tool and information provider for representative democracy.

 

ACCESS

Whatever voting systems have been used in the past, there have always been some people who found it convenient and others who were disenfranchised by it. This automatically creates a bias (Weinstein, 2000A, p. 2) and the groups most usually affected are the youth, certain ethnic groups, and those whose physical access is compromised.

Young people (age 18 to 34) are very energetic, enthusiastic and idealistic about how the world needs to be changed.  Some youth channel their energies into involvement in political affairs.  However, in general, they are remarkably under-represented amongst voting participants in England, New Zealand and the U.S. (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002). Although there may be many reasons for this low participation rate, some may be due to low levels of confidence that any elected representative would represent them adequately, or simply because democracy doesn’t seem sexy or cool.

However, the youth are high users of the Internet, and indications are that younger voters would be more likely to participate in elections if they could vote over the Internet (CIVT, 2000A, p. 26). In fact, increases in terms of intention to vote if able to do so over the Internet, have risen to over 70% among the youth (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572; Armacost et al., 2000, p. 3).

Another demographic group who are notorious under-participators are members of ethno-cultural communities, new immigrants and aboriginals (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 17-18). Although large amounts of publicity and concerted mobilization of these groups has worked with off-line elections (IPI, 2001, p. 25; Bowman, 2000), it is possible to design screens that individually attract the various ethno-cultural communities. This should have more appeal for these voters with regard to I-voting.

A further group who are disenfranchised by traditional voting means, and for whom this might be remedied by I-voting, are those with access disabilities.

Although the physically disabled are usually accommodated at polling booths or post offices, barriers still exist (IPI, 2001, p. 129).  Those who lack mobility, or who are institutionalized or housebound (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572), or who are sight impaired (Barry et al., 2002, p. 12) are all disadvantaged by the traditional means and could well benefit from I-voting.

Those who live in remote/rural areas (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572), the more transient voter (Armacost et al., 2000, p. 16), military or diplomatic personnel, students who live away from home (IPI, 2001, p. 27), business and holiday travelers (IPI, 2001, p. 5), emigrants and expatriates (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572) could all benefit from the easy accessibility of an I-voting system.  Furthermore, the complexity of the whole voting system would be decreased.

One last group whose participation could be increased are the eligible voters with low literacy skills.  The Internet provides the opportunity for forms of identification and information, other than text, to be used (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 18, 54).  Although these people cannot read, many of them play computer games and are not intimidated by simple computer applications.

The demographic groups discussed above have all, in their individual way, been underserved by current voting systems.  They have not enjoyed “free, fair and equal” opportunity for participating and remote I-voting may help provide a solution for them.  On the other hand, there is that sector of eligible voters who cannot use I-voting, and who suffer as a result of the digital divide.

The Digital Divide

The digital divide stands as the greatest social aspect which critics of remote I-voting use to discourage its introduction.

"The phrase ‘digital divide’ has been applied to the gap that exists in most countries between those with ready access to tools of information and communication technologies, and those without such access or skills" (Cullen, 2003).

Studies show that individuals with higher levels of income and education are more likely to have Internet access in Australia (Green, 1999, p. 101), in England (Bellamy & Taylor, 1998), in New Zealand (Robertson & Ofsoske, 2002, p. 9), and in the U.S.A. (Tolbert & McNeal, 2003). Whites, more so than other races (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 567), young people more than people over 55 (Gibson 2001-2002, p. 581), and men more than women (IPI, 2001, p. 26) are more likely to be Internet users. People unfamiliar with the Internet (Barry et al., 2002, p. 6), people with incompatible computer systems (IPI, 2001, p. 12), and people who are laggardly with regard to new technology (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 581) are also disadvantaged by the digital divide.

These trends are changing rapidly, however, and indications are that while education and age present a significant digital gap, the gap is closing in the areas of race and income (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572).

It thus appears, that if used as the sole means of voting – which is unlikely – those with greater Internet access and computer ability, would be advantaged by I-voting and this could result in a change in representation proportionality (Green, 2000, p. 6).

However, it is questionable whether a digital divide really exists when voters can cast their votes from any site where online access is available, such as schools, public libraries, offices, and hotels (KPMG & Sussex Circle, 1998, p. 54). If an extensive public education program were established, then it is arguable that I-voting, far from denying access to poor and ethnic minority voters, would actually increase it (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 572).

 

SOCIO-TECHNICAL ASPECTS

While acknowledging that all election systems have flaws, I-voting needs to be implemented as reliably and securely as possible without sacrificing voter privacy. 

Looking first at the system, elections, as time-critical events, can be thrown into irreversible chaos if the technology fails. The security of the vote server is also critical as any compromises will affect a large number of votes. An election is not likely to be voided if some home PCs yield corrupt votes, but malicious attacks, system crashes, power outages or user overload of the vote server could well have that effect (Gibson, 2001-2002, p. 573). Voters thus need to be assured of the integrity and reliability of the system. Unsatisfactory security and privacy measures could influence the public to have no confidence in the system (CIVT, 2000B, p. 22).

In addition, the platform and standards should support interoperability.  This helps bridge the digital divide and prevent disenfranchisement of any group or a bias of access. Using the Internet for candidate and policy information needs to be separate from the use for voting purposes, and authentication methods are essential to prevent impersonation and vote stealing (Green, 2000, p. 6).  Furthermore, the technology needs to ensure that the voter receives the correct ballot, and the voting screens need to facilitate the neutral positioning of the candidates.

From the voter’s side, s/he needs to ensure that their home computer is well protected by passwords (which they should not divulge to anyone), up-to-date virus protection software and firewalls if necessary. Not only could their home PC operating system have been contaminated by legitimate downloads such as patches and extensions, they are also subject to vulnerabilities, such as malicious software and should guard against activities such as spoofing (a fake site looks like the real thing, stealing the vote). They should furthermore be aware that if voting from work or a public place such as an hotel or library, while they may hope and trust that such precautionary measures have been taken, the voter cannot be 100% certain that no snooping (e.g. key-stroke storage, viewing by systems administrators or hackers, leaving footprints, ability to see previous screens with the “back” key) will be taking place.

Further possible problems which the voter may encounter are one’s vote being physically observed by someone else, coercion by family members or in institutional settings such as nursing homes or workplaces (IPI, 2001, p. 23), discrimination or persecution (Green, 2000, p. 2) - especially in the workplace - and vote buying and selling.

Apart from taking their own individual precautions, voters also need to be aware of, and prepared for, denial of service attacks. The result of these is a disenfranchisement of voters and a prevention of them voting. This might well happen closer to the end of an election period, so it would be advisable for voters to cast their votes sooner rather than later. A few high profile attacks, albeit not on public elections have been on Yahoo, eBay, CNN and E*Trade (Alexander & Jefferson, 2000, p. 2; IPI, 2001).

The last socio-technical aspect that voters need to be assured is secure, is the actual vote counting system. This needs to be free from outsider tampering, software miscalculations, or too much human counting or intervention which could influence the public to have no confidence in the system (Raney, 1999A, p. 2).

Auditability and transparency are important so that if there is any doubt about the outcome of an election, the validity can be assured (IPI, 2001, p. 12).   As the law provides for recounts, there has to be a verifiable, auditable method for recording votes.
The following are some methods that computer experts will use to identify security breaches (Carey, 2000): audit trails can be created and viewed for logging the activities of persons accessing sensitive data (Green & Kunze-Hamel, 2001B, p. 4); logging any changes made to the data (Green & Kunze-Hamel, 2001B, p. 4); checking that the encryption has not been tampered with or the seal broken; checking that each ballot came from a legitimate voter without identifying who the voter is (IPI, 2001, p. 38); and checking whether tampered votes came from a common IP address (N.Z.  Ministry of Justice et al, 2003, p. 53).

These socio-technical aspects can all exert a considerable influence on I-voting participation in public elections, and local governments would be advised to ensure that they are suitably addressed before introducing I-voting. 

Having examined the various sociological factors which can impact the uptake of I-voting, it appears that they fall neatly into five main groups: trust, apathy, features of the Internet, access and socio-technical aspects. The next section looks at the consolidation of these sociological factors into a conceptual framework.

CONCLUSION

 This paper has explored the sociological factors which can influence the uptake of I-voting for local government elections. It did this against a background of relevant democratic principles of free and fair elections, and against the backdrop of the Internet industry.

The importance of being perceived as being trustworthy was highlighted, as well as the contributing factors of gradual implementation of I-voting, the use of scrutineers, publication of the source code, and voter education.

In addition, access for previously underserved groups, such as the youth, certain ethno-cultural communities, those with limited access, and those with low literacy skills was identified as an important sociological factor which I-voting could facilitate.

The critical issue of how to address apathy was also discussed, as well as the potentially influential features of the Internet in terms of information provision, convenience, complexity, disintermediation, sense of community, and trivializing democracy. The socio-technical aspects of I-voting which can impact on the sociological factors were also explored.

The Internet provides a fast-changing environment and new and related topics will most certainly present themselves for exploration. However, many of the sociological aspects will remain stable for a number of years yet so a thorough understanding of them is to be encouraged, particularly if it means ensuring that the governments are representative of the people whose lives they regulate.

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